Case study 02 · Security tools

Sans
Password
Manager.

An offline password manager that puts encrypted records, recovery material, and operational control in the user’s hands.

2.10.6Current release
23Product screens
3Interface languages
0Required accounts

Running product

A complete local workflow.

Genuine documented captures from the 2.10.5 web interface show entry, daily vault use, credential generation, and portable transfer. No credentials in these screens are real.

Local / portable

Custody / control

The problem

Security without another service.

Many password managers ask people to trust an account, a subscription, a sync provider, and the vendor’s recovery process. The goal here was different: useful credential management with no mandatory cloud service and an inspectable local trust boundary.

12Tagged repository releases
23Documented product screens
3Interface languages shipped

My contribution

Security model and product experience.

I developed the product around portable shell tooling, GnuPG encryption, explicit recovery, and both CLI and local web interfaces.

The work connects cryptographic operations to ordinary tasks—searching, editing, importing, exporting, generating credentials, and managing one-time codes—without disguising who ultimately holds responsibility for the vault.

Ownership record

What I owned.

Role
Product and security-focused engineering
Period
2026 — present
Product context
Independent open-source tool
Responsibility
Security model, Bash implementation, GnuPG workflows, CLI and local web interfaces, portability, documentation, and release packaging

Trust boundary

Custody stays visible.

  1. 01 · PersonThe user owns the master secret and recovery responsibility.
  2. 02 · Local interfaceCLI or loopback web UI handles ordinary vault tasks.
  3. 03 · CryptographyGnuPG and OpenSSL perform inspectable local operations.
  4. 04 · Encrypted vaultRecords, history, locks, and atomic writes stay on the device.
  5. 05 · Explicit backupPortable exports exist only when the user creates and protects them.

Key decisions

01

Local by default

The vault works offline and requires no account, analytics service, or vendor-operated recovery channel.

02

Defence in layers

Encrypted records are supported by locking, atomic operations, history, backups, and explicit recovery workflows.

03

Portable interaction

A CLI and local web UI make the same system useful across Linux, macOS, and Termux-oriented workflows.

Result

A vault the user can take apart.

Release 2.10.6 documents 23 product screens, English, Indonesian, and Japanese interfaces, and multi-format import and export. The outcome is deliberately compact: files and familiar cryptographic tools remain understandable outside a proprietary service.

Honest boundary: local custody does not protect a compromised host from root access, malware, or keylogging. It also means there is no vendor back door when recovery material is lost.

Lock / recover

Own / understand